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Abstract The security environment in Japan’s neighbourhood has dramatically
deteriorated in recent times. China’s assertiveness in regional territorial issues and
demonstration of muscular power to assert its claims, North Korea’s nuclear and
missile launches, and US President Donald Trump’s pressure on Japan to shoulder
greater security burden are the three compelling factors that are propelling the Abe
administration to address appropriately how to respond to the new challenge
confronting Japan. In order to do that, the country’s ‘peace constitution’, particularly
Article 9, is constraining Abe in his objective to enact laws that could address to the
new challenge. Given the strong anti-military and anti-nuclear sentiment in the
country and given the difficult procedure to amend the Constitution, the best the Abe
government is able to do is to reinterpret the peace clause to achieve his objective
without actually enacting any amendment in the document. Even this measure to
collective self-defence is thorny. There is no consensus among political parties too.
This article addresses to this critical issue of domestic debate on collective self-
defence and attempt to revise the Constitution as the new situation demands, as well
as the responses from neighbouring countries such as China and South Korea to such
possible changes when they take place. Both China and South Korea continue to suffer
from the shadow of history and strongly react at the slightest sign of Japan increasing
its military capability as per the country’s need. Even the country’s defence forces are
not called ‘military’ but Self-Defence Forces with three separate wings for Army,
Navy and Air Force. The political stability of the Abe government has emboldened
Prime Minister to pursue a pro-active domestic policy. Though this raises the fear of
Japan returning to pre-War militaristic policy, in the current narrative of global
policy such fears are clearly misplaced. As a matured democratic nation that has
played decisive economic policy contributing to its own and to the region’s economic
prosperity, Japan in partnership with other friendly countries can play a decisive and
responsible role for peace and stability in the region. The analysis in the present paper
is relevant in this context and the challenges that Abe faces coping with this are
critically examined.
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Introduction
In an extremely controversial and massive shift for the countryʼs pacifist stance,
Japanʼs Cabinet took a historic decision on 1 July 2014 “Development of Seamless
Security Legislation to Ensure Japanʼs Survival and Protect its People”, that will
allow the Japanese government to reinterpret the Constitution allowing limited
exercise of the right of collective self-defence. The Shinzo Abe government hoped
that the new legislation when passed will enable Japan to coordinate with the
United States and other members of the international community, thereby
contribute to solidifying Japanʼs peace and security. Abe further hoped that the
constitutional reinterpretation would now help Japan to enhance its deterrent
power. He expressed his resolve to “consolidate Japanʼs path as a peace-seeking
nation”. Abe also pledged to establish “a seamless legal framework on national
security to protect the lives and daily livelihood of the people”.
It was not easy for the Abe government to reach such a historic decision. His
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) had policy differences with its coalition partner, the
New Komeito, which wanted the government to pursue a cautious approach on
permitting Japan to exercise the right of collective self-defence. But protracted
efforts on Abeʼs part finally led both the parties to find middle ground and reach an
agreement. Under the governmentʼs reinterpretation of the Constitution, particular-
ly Article 9, Japan will now be able to use the minimum necessary force when there
is an armed attack on a foreign country with which Japan has close relations, and
that there is a clear danger that the basic rights of the people of Japan are
fundamentally undermined.
The question that arises is: why did Abe feel the need for such a foreign policy
activism at this point of time? Since the end of World War II, Japan backed by its
“ Peace Constitution ”, adhered to a basic policy of maintaining an exclusively
national defense-oriented policy, and not become a military power that could pose a
threat to other nations. By observing the Three Non-Nuclear Principles,
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flourished as an economic power and distributed the economic dividends to its
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people. But since the Constitution of Japan came into operation seven decades ago,
the security environment surrounding Japan has dramatically deteriorated,
thereby exposing Japan to deal with significant security challenges. Chinaʼs brazen
expansionist policy and toughening stance on territorial issues, and coupled with
threat from North Koreaʼs nuclear and missile launches are matters of worry. While
acknowledging the so-called “UN forces”, an ideal proclaimed in the Charter of the
United Nations, with no prospect of realization, the Cabinet decision took
cognizance of the shift in the global power balance after the end of the cold war,
rapid progress of technological innovation, development and proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles as well as threats such as
international terrorism leading to tensions in the Asia-Pacific region, thereby
impacting directly on Japanʼs security. Moreover, the threats to maritime security
either stemming from maritime terrorism, piracy or unilateral decision by a single
country to impose its views and violating the United Nations Laws of Sea such as in
the South China Sea makes the security in the region more volatile. The Abe
administration felt that such a changed situation warranted an appropriate
response.
Implementing the law
March 29, 2017 marked another significant landmark in Japanʼs security policy as it
marked one year since the Shinzo Abe government enacted the new security-
related law that significantly broadened the scope of the countryʼs Self-Defense
Forcesʼ ( SDF ) activities, including enabling the limited exercise of the right of
collective self-defense. The law also gave the SDF personnel on UN peacekeeping
operations greater authority to use their weapons. The law expanded the
governmentʼs discretion over overseas operations of the SDFs and allowed the SDF
to provide logistical support to the militaries of the US and other nations operating
across the world.
2
Since Abe came to power in December 2012, Japan has been enjoying a rare spell of
political stability since Junichiro Koizumi retired from politics, leading to a spell of
what came to be known as ʻ revolving prime ministers ʼ. This period of political
instability came as a serious bottleneck in making legislation on critical issues
impinging the countryʼs security. Abeʼs assumption to power changed this situation
and the prime minister could afford to devote responding appropriately to the
deteriorating security environment in Japanʼs neighbourhood.
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The issue of the new security legislation remained controversial domestically since
the time the idea was mooted. Though Japanʼs national security remains vulnerable
to perceived threats from North Koreaʼs missile launches and Chinaʼs belligerence
on regional issues, the Japanese peoples are unprepared to accept their country to
take the burden to defend the country by themselves. They prefer to rely on the US
security umbrella so long as the Security Treaty remains in force.
In the meantime, Japanese media is divided on Japanʼs new security laws. While the
Yomiuri Shimbun seemed to endorse Abeʼs pro-active move, Asahi Shimbun is
sceptical of Japanʼs new laws, seen as a departure from the nationʼs pacifist stance.
Even some political parties are opposed to the new security law. Many lawsuits
have been filed across the nation to have the court declare the legislative package to
be “unconstitutional”. With strong public disapproval, the legislationʼs future looks
uncertain.
Post-Trump situation
This situation has somewhat changed after Donald Trump took over the US
Presidency. He has demanded greater security burden from the allies−Japan and
South Korea−by way of paying more to the cost of US forces stationed in the bases.
He made further controversial statement that the allies might even think of
acquiring their own nuclear weapons to defend their countries. Such statement was
alarming to the people in both Japan and South Korea, though emboldens the
hardliners and conservatives to demand for revisiting their nuclear options. The
situation however during the pre-Trump era was not dramatically different as the
clamour for revising the nuclear policies existed but was dormant. That voice gets
more currency now.
How has Japan been able to use this new law for the countryʼs security during the
past one year? And what changes have occurred in the security environment in
Japanʼs neighbourhood? Without doubt, threats from North Koreaʼs nuclear and
missile development programs have increased. The firing of a series of missiles by
North Korea, latest being in August and again in November 2017, many of which
landed in the Japanese waters is a matter of concern for Japan. The SDF has a
legitimate right under the new law now to monitor the Sea of Japan. The Maritime
SDF of Japan can now engage its Aegis-equipped vessels round the clock to
intercept any incoming missiles. If tensions heighten, Aegis destroyers from the US
Navyʼs 7
th
Fleet will also jointly monitor the situation. Even here, there are various
interpretations on the use of force.
Before the new security law came into force, if a US ship involved in surveillance or
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patrols for the defence of Japan was attacked, Japan was unable to defend that ship
unless Japan itself came under armed attack. The new law now enables the MSDF
to protect US vessels even in peacetime. The scope was expanded, according to
which MSDF can counterattack to protect weapons and other equipment of other
nations from being destroyed while in missions to defend Japan.
The urgency to operationalize the new security law with vigour was felt following
the missile launch by North Korea on 6 March, three of which landed inside Japanʼs
exclusive economic zone. The information obtained from Aegis ships and radars
across Japan were displayed on a larger screen in the underground centre at the
Air Self-Defense Forceʼs Air Defense Command headquarters inside the base. The
alarm was felt across the region when Pyongyang announced that the missiles were
an exercise by a unit tasked with launching an attack on US forces based in Japan,
thereby posing a threat both to Japan and the US.
Japan is seized of the reality that North Korea is capable of hitting Japan within 10
minutes of firing a missile. This led to seamless coordination between Japan and the
US to share information in peacetime to joint operations in potential emergencies.
Therefore an Alliance Coordination Mechanism mandated to closely coordinate
between the SDF and the US military was put in place. It remains unconfirmed that
Pyongyang has succeeded in miniaturizing a nuclear warhead capable of fitting it
onto a ballistic missile but the pace in which it is making advances on the weapon
system, the days are not far off when that becomes a reality. Japan, the US and
South Korea shall then face the real nightmare. North Koreaʼs advance in nuclear
program can no longer be seen as a far-fetched dream.
Increased heat from North Korean threat
In the latest escalation of tensions on the Korean Peninsula and the extended
neighborhood of Northeast Asia, North Korea fired another ballistic missile on July
4 that landed in Japanʼs exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in the Sea of Japan. This was
the fifth such missile fired by North Korea that landed in Japanʼs EEZ, the last one
being on May 29.
Each time North Korea launches a ballistic missile, it is an indication of having made
further advances in its missile capabilities. The one fired on July 4 July flew for
about 40 minutes and travelled around 930 kilometers. It was the 10
th
occasion in
2017 that North Korea fired a ballistic missile. On 8 June, it fired several surface-to-
ship cruise missiles, as well.
Following this most recent missile launch, North Korean state television claimed it
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successfully tested its first intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and that it could
hit targets anywhere in the world. North Korea said the Hwasong-14 missile, whose
launch was overseen by Kim Jong-un, reached an altitude of 2, 802 km and flew 933
km for 39 minutes before hitting a target in the sea. North Korea further boasted it
was now “a full-fledged nuclear power that has been possessed of the most powerful
intercontinental ballistic rocket capable of hitting any part of the world.” North
Korea believes that this capability will enable the country to “put an end to the US
nuclear war threat and blackmail” and defend the Korean Peninsula. Subsequently,
North Korea conducted the sixth nuclear test and launched two ballistic missiles in
August 2017 that flew over Japanʼs northern island of Hokkaido. Each of these
missiles had greater potency than missiles fired before.
Varying Opinions
Pyongyangʼs claims are suspect. Though the country has made considerable
advances in its nuclear and missile capabilities, some experts believe it does not
have the capability to accurately hit a target with an ICBM, or miniaturize a nuclear
warhead that can fit onto such a missile. Russia too cast doubt on North Koreaʼs
assessment and said the missile reached an altitude of 535 km and flew about 510
km. While the US militaryʼs Pacific Command claimed it was an ICBM, military
experts in South Korea believe Pyongyang fired a new type of medium-to-long-
range missile called a Hwasong-12, which was also launched on May 14. The South
Korean military believes that if the missile was fired on a normal trajectory, it could
travel as far as 4, 500 to 5, 000 km. US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson also
confirmed the missile launched was an ICBM and that it represents a new
escalation of the threat to the US, its allies and partners, and the world.
North Korea claims it has developed an ICBM that can carry a large nuclear
warhead. This triggered demands for global action that would hold it accountable
for pursuing nuclear weapons. Kim Jong-unʼs claim that the test completed his
countryʼs strategic weapons capability−which includes atomic and hydrogen
bombs and ICBMs−has the potential to alter permanently the balance of power in
East Asia. Given the pace with which North Korea is making advances in missile
and nuclear technology, it is difficult to doubt that Pyongyang has made a quantum
leap in its military reach. On a flatter trajectory, the missile could threaten all of
Alaska. The test successfully verified the technical requirements of an ICBM in
stage separation, the atmospheric re-entry of the warhead and the late-stage control
of the warhead.
3
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The North Korean threat poses a huge challenge to Trump and his Asian allies.
Even while Kim Jong-un remains undeterred and continues to defy the
international community through such provocative acts, Trump too has taken a
bellicose position, having run out of patience with Beijing, announcing that all
options, including a military strike, are on the table, if North Korea does not change
its behavior. At the same time, he has said that military action would be a last resort
and that sanctions and diplomatic pressure were the preferred course. Though
Pyongyangʼs acts have unnerved Japan, Prime Minister Abe held a meeting of his
National Security Council to assess the security threat and deferred a decision to
activate the J-Alert emergency warning system after it was concluded that there
was no possibility of the missile reaching Japanese land or waters. Japanʼs SDF also
did not take any specific measure to intercept the missile.
Much hope rests on China to exercise its influence on North Korea to change
course. But China is either incapable or unwilling to exert any pressure on
Pyongyang owing to its own strategic compulsions. US President Trump is
unwilling to wait for China to cooperate. Having taken North Korea threat seriously,
Trump is reviewing his policies towards the North, including consideration of
military options that could include pre-emptive strikes and cyber-attacks. Being
geographically close to North Korea, Japan feels the heat and intends to keep in step
with the US and ramp up the pressure on North Korea.
With no sign of cooperation from Beijing, Trump has declared that if needed, the US
will act unilaterally to deal with the threat of a nuclear North Korea. When Chinese
President Xi Jinping visited the US for a summit meeting with Trump on 6 April,
Trump urged Xi to put pressure on North Korea to give up its nuclear and missile
programs. Undeterred, Pyongyang fired an intercontinental ballistic missile on 4
July capable of hitting the US mainland. It remains unclear, however, what possible
actions Trump has in mind to deal with North Korea if China is unwilling to help.
China is North Koreaʼs only international ally. But China fears a possible unified
Korea would bring US troops close to its border, besides millions of refugees from
North Korea crossing into Chinese territory. Though China joined other nations in
imposing sanctions and banned coal imports from North Korea till the end of 2017,
these are cosmetic responses to please the outside world. Further details on this are
beyond the scope of this paper. That said, the North Korean issue remains alive for
Japan and other stakeholders to grapple with.
Japan still faces limitations
Even though the North Korean ICBM fired on 4 July in Japanese water exposing
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Japanʼs vulnerability, Japan still remains unclear on what sort of response it would
adopt if the same kind of missile flew over Japan in the future to target the mainland
US. The prospect of an ICBM fired by North Korea in the future flying through the
sky over Japan and towards the US became a more realistic possibility after the US
confirmed that the missile fired was an ICBM. The missile firing of August 2017
proved that. Though Japanʼs security-related legislation came into force in March
2016 making legally possible for Japan to intercept such a missile, Japan can only
conduct such an operation under strict conditions. High technological barriers also
need to be overcome.
The legislation of March 2016 incorporated three new conditions on the use of force
set forth by the Cabinet decision of July 2014 to reflect a change in the
interpretation of the Constitution. These conditions are ⒜ an armed attack occurs
and threatens Japanʼs survival; ⒝ there are no other appropriate means to protect
Japanʼs people; and ⒞ use of force is restricted to the minimum necessary. Japan
shall be able use force and shot down a ballistic missile heading toward the US only
if these three conditions are met.
In a hypothetical situation that also looks realistic in the background of missile
launch of 4 July, if North Korea fires another ICBM targeting Hawaii, home of the
headquarters of the US Pacific Command, which the US would use as a base for
launching operations to respond to a contingency on the Korean Peninsula, it would
fly over Japan. Even with the new security legislation in force, the government of
Japan is unsure if it could legally intercept such a missile in such a scenario.
However, if war broke out between the North Korea one side and South Korea and
the US on the other, and the government in Japan deemed that the countryʼs
survival was in danger under the three conditions, it would be within its legal rights
to intercept such a missile as a self-defensive measure. By contrast, Japan could be
legally prevented to shoot down a North Korean ICBM suddenly launched towards
the US in peacetime.
4
Japan has also to overcome technological and capability problems. While the US has
deployed the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) battery system in
South Korea amidst a lot of controversy, the same is not the case with Japan. Japanʼs
current missile defence system centres around Aegis destroyers equipped with
SM-3 interceptor missiles that can shoot down a target outside the atmosphere up
to a maximum altitude of about 500 km. The ability of SM-3s to shoot down a
ballistic missile is limited to the point as it begins to fall from its highest point after it
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flies through the air in a parabolic trajectory. But if North Korea fires an ICBM
aimed at the US it would have an increasing altitude at a high speed when it passes
through the sky over the Aegis vessels stationed in the Sea of Japan. So, the
capacity of the SM-3 interceptor missiles to neutralise an ICBM remains limited.
“The possibility of shooting down an ICBM likely would be increased if Aegis
vessels were stationed in the Pacific Ocean and equipped with the SM-3 Block IIA
interceptor missiles being developed by Japan and the United States. These
missiles will be able to shoot down a target at an altitude of more than 1, 000
kilometers”.
5
Debate on Revising Article 9 of the Constitution
The above limitation and constraint brings into discussion the issue of constitutional
revision, especially Article 9. Ever since Japanʼs constitution was promulgated 70
years ago, no single change in the document has ever been made. However, Prime
Minister Abe wants to change this trend and has resolved to complete the process
before the end of his time in office. The document adopted under the US occupation
had changed the balance between the state and Japanese society as well as the
trajectory of Japanʼs relations with the world. Abe wants to change this so as to
reflect the current world situation and set the date 2020 to coincide with the Tokyo
Olympics the same year. His reasoning is like the Tokyo Olympics of 1964, the
coming Olympics would be rebirth for Japan and wants to link this prospect of a
renaissance for Japan with constitutional revision. In focus is to amend the “no war”
clause in Article 9 by adding reference to the constitutionality of the nationʼs Self
Defence Force.
6
Abeʼs task is not easy. While the opposition decries his focus on the nationʼs military,
there is no consensus even within the ruling LDP. Even before initiating any move
to alter Article 9, Article 96 that sets forth the revision process needs to be
amended.
7
The first step in any attempt to revise an Article of the Constitution is
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that the proposal has to be passed by both the houses of the Diet with a two-thirds
majority. If the proposal is passed, the second step will be to put the proposal for a
national referendum in which majority of the eligible voters of the country must
endorse before the amendment takes effect. Given the reservations among the
various political parties, including those by some within the ruling party, on
tampering Article 9, and also given the strong anti-militaristic stance of the people,
it seems that Abeʼs objective is destined to be unrealisable. The structural obstacles
of Article 96 remains a subject of heavy domestic political contestation and limit
Abeʼs ability to alter Article 9. Despite the LDP has remained the dominant political
party for most of Japanʼs post-War history and having constitutional revision
written into its 1955 founding charter, no one LDP prime minister has succeeded.
Abe could be no different, though he would leave a legacy for his efforts to bring
some change, though unsuccessfully.
Any attempt to revise Article 9 by the Abe administration is likely to be seen
critically in China and South Korea in the prism of historyʼs shadow. Even within
Japan, there are deep passions in the Japanese people about the constitutionʼs
influence on the society and they will be unwilling to see any change. For them, the
constitution has served Japanʼs interest well in the past 70 years and they see no
reason to tamper with it. For them, the trust in the security alliance with the US for
the nationʼs security is paramount, no matter threats from North Korea has
heightened in recent times.
With Abe being serious in his attempt to achieve his objective, the coming three
years are going to witness intense debate and political discussions among all
spectrums in the Japanese society on their future positions. Besides political parties,
even religious groups in Japan are reorganising around the prospect of revising the
constitution. Amidst modernity, religious movements have remained a part of the
Japanese society since the Meiji Restoration, though their influence might have
waned. But their power to influence even a small segment of population cannot be
ignored.
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Other scholars also tend to compare the way Japan has approached revision with
other constitutional democracies. For example, David Law of Washington
University examined three popular misperceptions about the Japanese
constitution.
9
Law argues that it has been the desire of the conservatives to amend
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the post-war constitution, especially the strict commitment to pacifism enshrined in
Article 9, since the day it came into force. The three misperceptions that Law
mentions are ⒜ that the constitution is too difficult to amend, ⒝ that it is obsolete
and therefore in need of amendment, and ⒞ that it was imposed by the US
Occupation forces and therefore illegitimate. All three points have arguments in
their favour or against and both have merits.
The first misperception, according to Law, is that though no other constitution in
the world has lasted longest without amendment than the Japanese constitution of
1947, in a democratic set up it is up to the people if they want amendment to the
document. In Japanʼs case, the peoples have found good reason not to tamper with a
document that laid the foundation for decades of peace and prosperity. But in view
of the needs of the changing time, the LDP-led Abe government wants to push
through amending Article 9 but is unable to secure that. The truism is opinion polls
reveal that Japanese people consistently have shown little appetite for the kinds of
changes long sought by the LDP. So long as Article 96 that requires popular
ratification of constitutional amendments remains in force, all efforts by the LDP
would remain stymied. If any move by any political party to amend any article does
not have endorsement of the majority of people, it would be inadvisable for the
government to push through unpopular changes. In a democracy, the will of the
people is always supreme.
The second misperception, argues Law, is though Japanʼs constitution has lasted a
long time without any amendment, the argument to see it obsolete is invalid.
According to him, the document was far ahead of the time when drafted as it
conforms to the global norms of embracing human rights and non-violent
settlement of international disputes and therefore epitomises the deep commitment
to international norms and international law. Therefore, the argument that the
constitution has become obsolete is incorrect.
The third misperception, says Law, is the belief that the constitution was “imposed”
on the Japanese people. True, the document was initially drafted by a small group of
Americans working in total secrecy under the command of General Douglas
MacArthur, and the Japanese government was not given the liberty to reject the
basic principles of the document, such as demilitarisation, popular sovereignty
rather than imperial rule, and respect for human rights. But the fact that the
Japanese people at that time wanted the kind of a draft constitution that was on
offer and therefore to say that it was “imposed” is subject to interpretation in the
current political discourse. In fact, when the cabinetʼs own draft of the constitution,
known as the Matsumoto draft
10
, was leaked, it met with overwhelming negative
reaction from the Japanese public. The Japanese people wanted a new document
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that was fundamentally different that would not allow a repeat of the war policy and
therefore the American draft was found appropriate. The leaked Matsumoto draft
was no more different than the old Meiji Constitution, barring cosmetic changes.
This was unacceptable to the general public.
It seems that the draft produced by Japanʼs Shidehara cabinet was unacceptable by
the people and it was only then Gen MacArthur intervened to produce a document
that the people could embrace.
11
Law observes that polls conducted before and
after the constitution was adopted showed that the Japanese people wanted a
constitution that would reduce the role of the emperor to a purely symbolic role,
expansion of the powers of the Diet, abolition or reform of the House of Peers,
greater responsiveness to the will of the people, and greater protection for
individual rights and freedoms.
12
While the Matsumoto draft lacked all of these, the
American draft included all these expectations of the people. MacArthurʼs approach
demonstrated utmost respect for the wishes of the Japanese people. When the issue
of referendum on the constitution was raised, Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida
lacked argument against it as he conceded that the Japanese public opinion was
opposed to any revision of the new constitution. Under the circumstance,
MacArthurʼs insistence upon a popular ratification requirement for constitutional
amendments empowered the Japanese people to prevent their political leaders to
usurp power ever in the future. That makes Article 96 extremely significant and a
check on the leaders on tampering with the constitution.
Professor Adam Liff of Indiana University argues how Abeʼs reinterpretation of the
Article 9 to allow for collective self-defence has affected the operations of Japanʼs
military. Though attempts have been made in the past to “shift the goal posts”,
Abeʼs attempt is the first that makes it significant during the past 70 years.
13
Yet,
the effective interpretation of Article 9 is “ subject to significant constraints ”.
However, Abe has succeeded in making incremental changes in advancing Japanʼs
defence posture overseas in response to the changing security environment in
Japanʼs neighbourhood. Abe allowed first the massive helicopter carrier Izumo to
escort a US Navy supply ship in May 2017
14
and then sent the same carrier to take
part in the Japan-US-India trilateral naval military drills in the Bay of Bengal in the
first week of July 2017, thereby expressing its willingness and ability to project
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power.
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Such a move was defined in the 2015 US-Japan Guidelines for Defence
Cooperation as “mutual protection of each otherʼs assets … if engaged in activities
that contribute to the defence of Japan”.
16
This also could be read as “an armed
attack” is not a precondition.
That Japanʼs security policy has been undergoing evolutionary and incremental
reforms in response to changing external threat perceptions and shifting domestic
political winds is not surprising. So, to attribute all such trends to Abe as the
initiator could mean overlooking Japanʼs security needs. What all Abe has
attempted is within the ambit of constitutional provisions, which is why there is
public acceptance of his policies. The peoples have reposed their faith in Abeʼs
leadership and voted him five times to the helm. Lately however, Abeʼs grip in
domestic politics seems to be loosening, as his partyʼs defeat in the Tokyo Mayorʼs
election in June 2017 demonstrated. It seemed to be a temporary aberration and
Abe was expected to correct them soon and he did when he dissolved the Lower
House, sought fresh mandate on 22 October and returned with overwhelming
majority, giving himself with enough time to accomplish his agenda in the nationʼs
interest.
Though the core meaning of the Article 9 and the actual text remains intact, its
interpretation has diluted the spirit to some extent, thereby allowing Abe to
achieve his objective, partially if not fully. This is because of perceived “external
threats, weapon technologies, and shifting domestic political winds ”. Even past
governments and opposition parties, including the Japan Communist Party, have
taken a liberal view on Article 9 and Abe is just building on that platform, albeit
more vigorously. He has therefore argued vigorously in defence of 2014 defence
resolution as a necessary response to an increasingly dangerous regional security
environment. Dismissing Abe as a “nationalistic hawk” would be to undermine the
nationʼs security needs and exposing it to vulnerability. Abe has to make significant
concession to his coalition partner Komeito, which is not on the same page with Abe
always.
Debate on Collective Self-Defence and Constitutional Revision in Japan
13
14 Ankit Panda, “Japanʼs Izumo Helicopter Carrier to Escort US Navy Supply Ship”, The Diplomat, 1
May 2017, http: //thediplomat. com/2017/05/japans-izumo-helicopter-carrier-to-escort-us-navy-supply-
ship/
15 Rajaram Panda, “Relevance of Malabar 2017 Naval Exercise−Analysis, 12 July 2017, http://www.
eurasiareview.com/12072017-relevance-of-malabar-2017-naval-exercise-analysis/. Also see, Harsh V. Pant,
“ Get Australia into Malabar Exercises ”, Deccan Herald, 17 July 2017, http: //www. deccanherald.
com/content/623077/get-australia-malabar-exercises.html
16 See, “The Guidelines for Japan-U. S. Defense Cooperation April 27, 2015 ”, http://www.mofa.go.
jp/files/000078188.pdf
Likely Response from China
China perceives Abe as a nationalist who is determined to dramatically alter Japanʼs
security posture and revision of Article 9 is the prerequisite. China sees Abeʼs
slogan during the election campaign to “take back Japan” by interpreting as taken
back Japanʼs army by the American occupation forces, and therefore alarming as
such a policy could challenge the liberal order that the Japanese people have
embraced for the past 70 years. Chinaʼs fear also stems from the perception that
Abe is undermining popular opinion against revision as demonstrated by many
opinion polls by the Japanese media. China fears if Japan shall continue to maintain
its pacifism or opt for a robust military posture and sees Abeʼs policy from such
prism.
The future of Japanʼs peace constitution can have significant implications for the
China-Japan relationship.
17
The average Chinese still have deeply rooted
apprehensions about Japanʼs repeating its militarist mistakes. Given the already
troubled relationship over territorial issues, bilateral ties could get further
complicated if Abeʼs objectives are closer to realisation. China fears mistrust shall
deepen creating new obstacles to regional cooperation.
Likely Response from South Korea
Like China, Japan-South Korea relations suffers from the shadow of history. Most
Koreans are against Japanʼs constitutional reform and consider it as a sign of Japanʼs
revert to militarism. The comfort women, a euphemism for sex slaves of Korean
women used by Japanese military to work in war front brothels during the World
War II, continues to haunt bilateral ties and a constant irritant, fanning anti-
Japanese feeling in South Korea. The common threat of North Korea has not helped
to improve the Korean perception of Japan.
However, there is also another view in South Korea that tends to take a softer
perspective towards Japan. For example, Seong-ho Sheen of Seoul National
University is of the opinion that Japan is unlikely to have any desire to return to
militarism, as its people feel that they are the greatest victims of such a past. He
argues that with a super-aging population and a shrinking economy, Japan is
unlikely to have the appetite and capacity to become an expansionist power if it
wanted to. Sheen feels that the revision efforts are under the US duress as the US is
demanding a more active role by the Japanese military in order to augment the
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Japan-US alliance. The US demand on Japan is that Japan must adjust to the
present unbalanced alliance. However, Sheenʼs views belong to the minority opinion
among both the educated intellectuals and the commoners in South Korea.
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Assessment
However, if Japan succeeds in revising the Constitution, it is likely to result in angry
protests on the streets of both Seoul and Beijing. In such a situation, Japan would
clarify the circumstance under which such revisions were undertaken but given
the historical interpretations and territorial issues, it would only aggravate mutual
suspicions and distrust, leading to deterioration of Japanʼs ties with China and South
Korea. As both South Korea and China would view constitutional revision in Japan
as a sign of return to the militarist past, it could also provoke a new round of arms
race in the region. Japan needs to make responsible choice in order to avoid such a
situation developing. A large percentage of South Korean people still hold a
negative image of Japan. Japan cannot afford to aggravate this further.
While a complete overhaul of the Article 9 is unlikely, the Abe administration is
interpreting Article 9 Paragraph 2 which states “land, sea, and air forces, as well as
other war potential, will never be maintained” arguing that the SDF maintains self-
defense capability rather than war potential, and that it is an organisation using
force rather than a military.
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This clarification is because the relation between the
Constitution and the SDF has been a confusing issue and therefore needs clarity.
An explicit description of the SDF in the Constitution would carry significant
meaning.
There are several ways Article 9 has been interpreted. The current Article 9
contains limitations when interpreted to mean that armed forces can only be used
for self-defense, and that logistical support for the US military and others is only
possible when not integrated with the use of armed force. This argument is often
made in which consensus seems to be eluding. The use of force is a contentious
issue and the conditions in which it can be used needs clarification. The Cabinet
decision of July 2014 specified three conditions on the use of force. These are: ⒜ an
armed attack against Japan or a foreign country that is in a close relationship with
Japan occurs and threatens Japanʼs survival while also posing a clear danger to
fundamentally overturning peopleʼs rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of
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happiness; ⒝ there are no other appropriate means to ensure Japanʼs survival and
protect its people; and ⒞ use of force is restricted to a necessary minimum.
Future Prognosis
It transpires that Prime Minister Abe is still struggling to figure out specific ways
to revise the Constitution, a deeply held desire ever since he assumed the
premiership for the first time in 2006, even though the pro-constitutional
amendment forces currently occupy two-thirds majorities in both houses of the
Diet, enough to initiate referendum. His trial and error tactics on constitutional
amendment reflect his long-held desire. Abe has not been able to bring on board the
largest opposition Democratic Party, and the Communist Party, both of which are
against constitutional revision.
When his second Cabinet commenced in December 2012, Abe raised the issue of
revising Article 96, which stipulates that two-thirds majority votes in both houses of
the Diet are necessary to initiate a referendum to specify a simple majority. When
this evoked serious backlash not only from the opposition and constitutional
scholars but also his coalition partner Komeito, Abe stopped raising this issue.
Further, he refrained from promoting constitutional amendment during the
campaign for the 2016 House of Councillors election, where the focus was to secure
two-thirds majority as the first step. Now Abe is playing his cards carefully and has
plans to include constitutional amendment into his political agenda. What the
parties want is clarity. For example, Komeito leader Natsuo Yamaguchi observed
on 2 May 2017 while addressing an audience: “ We donʼt mean to reject
constitutional amendment if changes would make the Constitution better”. At the
same time, he said, “thereʼs no consensus over what to change. Itʼs important to hold
in-depth discussions on how the country should be and ideology on that subject”.
This shows the ruling party and its junior partner are not at the same wavelength.
Moreover, the “two-thirds majority card” will be lost if the LDP loses seats in the
next lower house election, scheduled to be held sometime before December 2018.
Yet, Prime Minister Abe has put the target 2020 to see the revision takes effect
when Japan shall be “born anew”. He can serve as LDP president until September
2021 if he wins a third consecutive term as party leader in the next leadership vote
in the fall of 2018.
Developments after October 2017
When in a surprise move Abe dissolved the Lower House in September and called
for snap polls on 22 October, eyebrows were raised amongst the opposition about
Abeʼs hidden agenda. What transpired was that Abe scored a resounding victory
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securing a two-thirds supermajority in both houses of the Diet, emboldening him to
pursue his agenda. In his first policy speech after the landslide victory in the
parliament, Abe pledged to bolster Japanʼs defence power, including missile
capabilities in order to protect the peopleʼs lives and peace and amend the countryʼs
pacifist constitution. For nationalist Abe, the constitution is a humiliating relic
imposed by the US occupiers after Japanʼs defeat in World War II and therefore
wants to change the wording of the document so that Japan can have a full-fledged
military. What Abe wants is to push ahead with changing the pacifist constitution
but keep the clause that prevents Japan from waging an offensive war. Abe sees
the North Korean threats as a national crisis. It is a different matter that his
tentative move towards revamping the pacifist constitution could trigger alarm
bells in China and the Koreas given Japanʼs history of military aggression in the
region.
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Japanʼs defence profile has seen an incremental rise since Abe took office in 2012
with military spending increasing steadily. During his visit to Tokyo in November
2017, Trump urged Abe to buy many more US arms. The US ambassador to Japan
William Haggerty too remarked that the US is trying to make more advanced
weapons technology available to Japan more efficiently and to increase Japanʼs
capability and interoperability and make the US military more effective in the
region.
Following Abeʼs policy speech, political parties voiced their stances. Emphasising
his confrontational attitude, the leader of Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan
Yukio Edano insisted the security-related laws, which allows Japan a limited
exercise of the right of collective self-defense as “unconstitutional”. On the other
hand, Yuichiro Tamaki, head of Kibo no To (Party of Hope) opposed a conciliatory
approach towards North Korea and displayed readiness to accept discussing a
broad range of constitutional issues, including the right to know and the local
autonomy. However, he was uncomfortable about the haste in which Abe is pushing
his agenda. He wanted more discussion on the issue.
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It is not going to be smooth for Abe, however. Public opinion is against, if not hostile,
to Abeʼs agenda. Tens of thousands of people staged a rally in central Tokyo in early
November outside the Diet to mark the 71
st
anniversary of the promulgation of the
Constitution to protest Abeʼs push to amend the Constitution. Akira Kawasaki, a
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member of the international steering group of the International Campaign to
Abolish Nuclear Weapons, winner of 2017 Nobel Peace Prize observed: “ The
Japanese government is on the path of opposing a ban on nuclear weapons and
destroying Article 9 of the Constitution ”. Referring to the war-renouncing
Constitution, Kawasaki remarked “The right path to take is to campaign to protect
and use Article 9 and eliminate nuclear weapons globally ”.
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Former Supreme
Court justice Kunio Hamada also expressed opposition to Abeʼs proposal for
amending Article 9 to legitimize the SDFs by observing the proposal “ will
undermine the trust and standards built over the 70 years since the end of World
War II”. What emboldens Abe is that the ruling bloc currently holds a two-thirds
majority in both chambers of the Diet, the level required to put constitutional
revisions to a national referendum.
Conclusion
As an impetuous Trump and unpredictable Kim Jong-un trading escalatory words
threatening to annihilate each other, Japan finds itself in a vulnerable situation as it
could be caught in the vortex of a regional conflict, which if not checked, could also
assume global dimensions. Chinaʼs role to use its leverage to address the North
Korean crisis remains questionable. This leaves Abe with no choice than to prepare
his nation to defend itself if a situation arises. This lies at the core of Abeʼs agenda.
Notwithstanding Trumpʼs outreach to China after a brief threat of economic
reprisal with a view to address the trade imbalance, the observations of Peter
Navarro in his book Crouching Tiger: What China’s Militarism Means for the World
indicating strong suspicion on Chinaʼs intentions cannot be overlooked. As Chinaʼs
surge in military capability and plans to build a 5, 000-km “underground great wall
to store ballistic nuclear missiles continues, the US and Russia continue to reduce
their nuclear warheads significantly. Does this mean that the US and China are
heading towards a collision course with perilous consequences for the region and
the world? Can Japan afford to sit idle and watch this disturbing development in its
neighbourhood?
Abe seems convinced that the element of distrust between Japan and China is not
going to go away anytime soon. Chinaʼs dream of becoming a strong military power
and building a new international order based on Chinese values unnerves not only
Japan but many other Asian countries. Moreover, the future of US-China and US-
Russia relations are difficult to predict. The choice left before Japan seems to be
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two-fold: strengthen the existing alliance relationship with the US and strengthen
its own preparedness to cope with the evolving grave situation in its neighbour-
hood. Unilateral dependence on the US does not look to be the sole option as there
are elements of uncertainties. Removing the legal constitutional hurdles seems to be
the prerequisite for Abe to prepare Japan to cope up with the challenge confronting
the nation.
So, given Prime Ministerʼs determination after 70 years can Japan finally find itself
on the cusp of acquiring its own military? That would not be easy. Though
strengthening its militaristic posture in the wake of Chinese assertiveness on
territorial issues and North Korean threat could seem a valid reason for a
reasonable response, the path to assume such a posture is never smooth. Abe has to
cross several hurdles, some of which appear insurmountable. To the outside world,
Japanʼs SDF is just military in all but name and what Abe wants is to give it a legal
legitimacy. If China does not halt its aggressive posture and North Korea does not
pause its nuclear and missile programs, public opinion inside Japan might swing
swiftly in favour of amending the constitution and referendum then would no
longer be a hurdle. In that case, Abe would have left an indelible mark in Japanʼs
history. In the process, the security dynamics in the Northeast Asian region as well
as in the larger Asia would have undergone dramatic change with inevitable policy
response from China, South Korea and other nations in the region. At the moment it
appears to be a mere will-o-the-wisp.
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